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ABSTRACT 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) perform a vital role in corporate finance in enabling firms achieve 
varied objectives and financial strategies. This study sought to comprehend the impacts that previous 
bank mergers have had on the shareholders’ wealth. The study location was in Kenya and it adopted 
the descriptive survey and correlation design in which the success of mergers was measured based on 
the objective oriented model using the annual accounts. The study computed the return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) and the efficiency ratio (EFF) as indicators of shareholder value. The 
results of the commercial banks were analysed for a five-year period (2006-2010). The study reveals 
that mergers significantly influence shareholder value with banks that have undertaken mergers 
creating more value than those that have not. Such banks were ascertained to have posted better 
results than the overall sector.  
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1. Introduction 
 
According to Marks & Mirvis (2010), global value of M&As rose from $462 billion in 1990 to more than 
$4.6 trillion in 2007 slowing down in the next two years following the financial meltdown. Acquired 
company shareholders typically do very well, especially in cases where the acquirer pays a premium 
to forestall competitive bidding. The acquirers frequently experience share price underperformance 
in months following an acquisition with negligible long-term gains. Nearly two thirds of companies 
lose market share in the first one-quarter after the merger and by the third quarter, the figure leaps 
to 90% (Marks & Mirvis, 2010). M&As transactions in the financial sector comprise a surprisingly large 
share of value of merger activity worldwide. During 1985-2000, there were approximately 233,700 
M&As transactions worldwide in all industries, for a total of $15.8 trillion (Ingo, 2004). Of this total, 
there were 116,150 M&As in the financial service industry (49.7%), valued at $8.5 trillion (Ingo, 2004). 
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While M&As continue to be a popular corporate strategy (Gopinath, 2003), there is unrelenting 
evidence that M&As failure rates are high (Cartwrght & Schoenberg, 2006). Few industries have 
encountered as much strategic turbulence in recent years as has the financial service sector. In 
response to far-reaching regulatory and technological changes together with important shifts in client 
behaviour and the globalization of specific financial functions, the organizational structure of the 
industry has been profoundly displaced (Ingo, 2004). 
 
Regulatory and public policy changes that allow firms broader access to clients, functional lines of 
activity, or geographic markets may trigger corporate actions in the form of M&As. Similarly, 
technological changes that alter characteristics of financial services or their distributions are clearly a 
major factor. So are clients who often alter their views on the relative value of specific financial 
services or distribution interfaces with vendors and their willingness to deal with multiple vendors 
(Ingo, 2004). Deregulation in the financial market, market liberalization, economic reforms and a 
number of other factors perform an important function behind the growth of M&As in the banking 
sector. The growth of M&As during the period of economic downturn that started in 2007, is likely to 
be more faster, as more companies will need to develop strategic alliances, acquire or merge to 
survive (Ulijin et al., 2005). Mishkin (1998) predicts that if the trend in bank M&As will continue, then 
in the next twenty years, the number of banks will be less than half the current number. 
1.1 Research Problem 
The fundamental motive for undertaking M&As activities is to create value for the shareholders by 
enhancing their wealth. Shareholder wealth creation has become the new corporate paradigm and is 
considered one of the main objectives of companies. 
 
Indeed, one of the most basic and fundamental conviction of capitalism is the obligation to create and 
maximise shareholders wealth. It is measured by the stock price which reflects the timing and risk 
associated with future benefits expected to be received by the shareholders (Moyer et al., 2008). It 
can also be measured in terms of ROE, ROA and EFF. Mergers in the banking sector have the capacity 
to ensure efficiency, profitability and synergy. Through M&As, banks seek strategic benefits in the 
sector as well as attempting to enhance their customer bases. Despite observing a strong increase in 
merger activities across the world, a vast majority of these unions seem to be unsuccessful. Indeed, 
over the last fifteen years, 45% of all merged firms have reported lower profits than comparable non-
merged firms (Gugler et al., 2003). More than 50% of mergers fail to reach value. CEOs of merging 
companies promise shareholders handsome returns through increased market reach, economies of 
scale, consolidation of operations and synergies (Cools et al., 2007). Dessein et al. (2006) confirm 
countless examples of failed mergers that were unable to achieve the synergies that motivated the 
deals. According to Cools et al. (2007), between 1996 and 2006, 50% of the M&As destroyed 
shareholders value of the acquiring firms producing a net loss of 1.2% of all transactions.  
 
M&As are acknowledged to be successful only if they lead to an increment in shareholders’ wealth. 
Bouwman et al. (2003) conclude that it depends on the various factors such as the valuation methods 
(using short term or long term stock performance or accounting methods), methods of payment 
(cash, stock or mixed) among other factors. Similarly, Wang (2007) confirms that M&As increases 
value for the stockholders of the target company, whereas they decrease the acquiring and the newly 
combined company’s value.  
 
2. Research Methodology 
 
The study employed both descriptive survey and correlation design. The descriptive design was 
considered because it involves collecting data which were used to test hypotheses. The correlation  
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design was chosen since it involves the description in quantitative terms the degree to which 
variables are related (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).  A census method was preferred and focused on 
the twenty three (23) banks in Nairobi, Kenya which had their M&As approved by the year 2008 (CBK: 
Bank Mergers & Acquisitions, 2010). The study period was between 2006- 2010. Primary data was 
collected through the use of questionnaires from key informants in the Finance or Legal affairs 
divisions of the banks and who hold the position of a manager. The secondary data were collected 
through document analysis of published information from the Central Bank available in annual 
supervision reports (ASR) and the published financial statements of the participating banks. The 
following ratios were calculated; ROA, ROE and EFF. Pearson Product Moment of Correlation were 
applied to determine the extent of the relationship between the elements of a merger and the 
shareholders’ wealth and the directions of such relationships. The first-order correlation was applied 
to test the direction of relationships between mergers and shareholders’ value.  
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
3.1 Relationship among study variables 
Correlation Analysis 
In order to establish the relationship among the different variables in the study, a zero-order 
(bivariate) correlation analysis was conducted on the main motive (MM) of M&As and the 
shareholders’ wealth indicators, the shareholder wealth indicators themselves and between the 
organizational factors and the shareholder wealth indicators. 
 
M&As demonstrate statistically significant relationship to the shareholder wealth indicators (ROA, 
ROE & EFF) both at the 95% and the 99% level of significance (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Correlations between Independent and Dependent variables 
 MM ROA ROE EFF 
MM 1    
ROA .475* 
.040 
1   
ROE .680** 
.001 
.863** 
.000 
1  
EFF -.595* 
.012 
-.615** 
.009 
-.679** 
.003 
1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
(Source: Research Data, 2012). 
 
A positive relationship exists between the MM of undertaking M&As and the organizations’ ROA (r= 
0.475*, p=0.040). This relationship implies that M&As influences shareholders’ wealth positively. Also, 
there was a positive relationship between M&As and ROE (r=0.680**, p=0.001). This signifies that in 
order to maximize shareholders’ wealth, an organization should seek to maximize ROE (Haffernan, 
2005). Consequently, a negative relationship exist between the MM and EFF (r= -0.595*, p= 0.012). 
This implies that M&As and EFF are related although negatively and that an organization seeking to 
maximize shareholder value should endeavour to reduce the EFF.   
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3.2 Effects of bank mergers on shareholders wealth 
Tests of Hypothesis 
To determine whether value creation to the shareholders as a result of a merger has been significant, 
the first objective is guided by hypothesis (H1
H1: Mergers have no significant influence on the shareholder value. 
)  
Regression Analysis 
In determining the extent of influence of mergers on the shareholder value, regression analysis was 
conducted with M&As as predictors of each of the shareholder value indicators and results presented 
below in the Tables 2:R1 - 2.3:R3; 
 
Table 2: R1: Regression results for MM and ROA 
 
(a) Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .475(a) .225 .180 1.027 
a Predictors: (Constant), MM 
 
(b) ANOVA 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5.215 1 5.215 4.941 .040(a) 
  Residual 17.943 17 1.055     
  Total 23.158 18       
a Predictors: (Constant), MM  
b Dependent Variable: Banks Five-year average ROA 
 
 (c) Coefficients 
Model   
Un-standardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 2.086 .558   3.736 .002 
   
MM .486 .219 .475 2.223 .040 
a Dependent Variable: Banks Five- year average ROA 
(Source: Research Data, 2012). 
 
Regression analysis was conducted with the MM of M&As as a predictor of ROA. The results reveals 
that 22.5% of the variance in the ROA is accounted for by MM with r= 0.475, F (1, 17) = 4.941, 
t>2.101, p = 0.04. M&As have a positive coefficient implying that a unit standard deviation increase in 
MM leads to a 0.475 standard deviations increase in ROA. Alternatively, a one unit change in MM 
results into a 0.486 unit change in ROA in the same direction. The linear regression equation for ROA 
given MM would thus be expressed as;  
ROA= 2.086+ 0.486 MM.  
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Table 2.1: R2: Regression results for MM and ROE  
(a) Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .680(a) .462 .430 .879 
a Predictors: (Constant), MM 
 
 (b) ANOVA 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 11.278 1 11.278 14.588 .001(a) 
  Residual 13.143 17 .773     
  Total 24.421 18       
a Predictors: (Constant), MM 
b Dependent Variable: Organization's Five-year average ROE 
 
(c) Coefficients 
Model   Un-standardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 1.714 .478   3.588 .002 
   
 
MM 
.714 .187 .680 3.819 .001 
a Dependent Variable: Organization's Five-year average ROE 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The regression analysis in the second component was administered with MM as a predictor of ROE. 
The results reveal that 46.2% of the variability in ROE was explained by the MM with, r=0.68, F (1, 17) 
= 14.588, t>2.101 and p = 0.001. The positive values of the coefficients B= 0.714 and β= 0.68 is an 
indication that MM positively influences ROE (β=0.68, p=0.001 <0.05). 
 
Table 2.2 R3: Regression results for MM and EFF 
 (a)  Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .595(a) .354 .311 1.039 
a  Predictors: (Constant), MM 
 
 (b) ANOVA 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 8.863 1 8.863 8.208 .012(a) 
  Residual 16.196 15 1.080     
  Total 25.059 16       
a Predictors: (Constant), MM 
b Dependent Variable: Organization's Five-year average EFF 
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(c) Coefficients 
Model   
Un-standardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 5.365 .613   8.754 .000 
   
MM -.664 .232 -.595 -2.865 .012 
a Dependent Variable: Organization's Five-year average EFF 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The regression analysis was applied with the MM as a predictor of EFF. The results disclose that 35.4% 
of the variability of the EFF is explained by the MM with r= 0.595, F= 8.208, absolute t>2.101 and p= 
0.012. There was however a negative relationship indicated by the coefficients B= -0.664 and β= -
0.595. The results affirms an influence of MM on EFF  (β= -0.595, p=0.012 <0.05). This implies that the 
EFF influences the shareholder value negatively representing that in order to improve or grow 
shareholder value; banks should seek to reduce EFF. 
H1
3.3 Influence of the contextual factors on the relationship between M&As and shareholder value. 
 is rejected and organizations can pursue M&As as a strategy of improving the shareholder value.  
  
In determining this influence, the study is guided by the second hypothesis (H2
H2: Organizational factors have no influence on the relationship between M&As and shareholders’ 
wealth. 
).  
Partial Correlations 
In indicating the effect of organizational factors on the relationship between the MM and the 
shareholder value indicators, a first-order correlation was performed by introducing each of the 
moderating variables on the zero-order correlation results between M&As and the shareholder value 
indicators (Table 3):   
 
Table 3: Zero-order correlations between MM and shareholders’ value indicators 
 MM ROA ROE EFF 
MM 1 
 
   
ROA .475* 
.040 
1   
ROE .680** 
.001 
.863** 
.000 
1  
EFF -.595* 
.012 
-.615** 
.009 
-.679** 
.003 
1 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).             (Source: Research Data, 2012). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Business and Social Research (IJBSR), Volume -2, No.-6, November 2012 
168 | P a g e  
 
Effect of Relative size 
Table 3.1: First- Order Correlations of Relative Size and Shareholders’ Wealth 
With the effect of Relative Size 
 MM ROA ROE EFF 
MM 1 
 
   
ROA 0.4732 
0.064 
1   
ROE 0.7580 
0.001 
0.7989 
0.000 
1  
EFF -0.6377 
0.008 
-0.6127 
0.012 
-0.6739 
0.004 
1 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The effect of relative size on shareholders’ wealth can be observed in Column 2 of Table 3.1 and 
comparing the values with corresponding values in Table 3. The introduction of relative size 
strengthens the relationship between MM and ROE with rold= 0.680**, p= 0.001 to rnew=0.7580, p= 
0.001. Similarly, relative size has an expansionary effect on the relationship between MM and EFF 
with rold= -0.595*, p= 0.012; to rnew
With the effect of Method of Payment 
= - 0.6377, p= 0.008. It can therefore be concluded that relative 
size influences the relationship between M&As and shareholders’ wealth. This finding is consistent 
with those of Kusewitt (1985); Frensch (2007); DePamphilis (2010) & Gorton et al. (2009).  
 
3.4 Influence of Method of Financing 
In determining whether method of financing influences the relationship between M&As and 
shareholders’ value, method of financing was introduced in the bivariate correlation result between 
MM and shareholder value indicators (Table 3 ) and its effect observed in the Table 3.2  below;  
 
Table 3.2: Result of Partial correlation method of Financing and Shareholder value   
 MM ROA ROE EFF 
MM 1 
 
   
ROA 0.4111 
0.114 
1   
ROE 0.7026 
0.002 
0.767 
0.001 
1  
EFF -0.5775 
0.019 
-0.6136 
0.011 
-0.6652 
0.005 
1 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The method of payment suppresses the relationship between MM and all the shareholder value 
indicators except for ROE whose relationship with MM seem to be expanded by introducing the effect 
of method of finance with rold= 0.680**, p= 0.001 to rnew= 0.7026, p= 0.002. Method of financing 
restricts the relationship between MM and ROA with rold= 0.475*, p = 0.040 to rnew= 0.4111, p = 0.114. 
The relationship between MM and EFF is constrained with rold= -0.595*, p = 0.012 to rnew= -0.5775, p = 
0.019.  
 
3.5 Influence of Number of Bidders 
In testing for the effect of number of bidders on the relationship between M&As and the shareholder 
value, the variable number of bidders was introduced on the results of a bivariate correlation of MM 
and shareholder value indicators (Table 3) and the result are observed as follows; 
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Table 3.3: Result of Zero-order correlation of Number of Bidders on shareholder wealth 
With the effect of Number of Bidders 
 MM ROA ROE EFF 
MM 1 
 
   
ROA 0.4546 
0.077 
1   
ROE 0.7503 
0.001 
0.8071 
0.000 
1  
EFF -0.5977 
0.014 
-0.6146 
0.011 
-0.6885 
0.003 
1 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The number of bidders expands the relationship between MM and the ROE as well as EFF from rold= 
0.680**, p = 0.001 to rnew= 0.7503, p = 0.001: and from rold= -0.595**, p = 0.012 to rnew= -0.5977, p = 
0.014 for ROE and EFF respectively. Number of bidders however has a restraining effect on the 
relationship between MM and ROA with rold= 0.475*,  p= 0.040 to rnew
 
Organizational  
Factor 
=0.4546, p= 0.077.  
 
Table 3.4: Summary of Zero and First-order Correlation for Testing H2  
Shareholder 
Value  
Indicator 
Zero-Order 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
First-Order 
Correlation  
Coefficients 
Observation 
METHFINCE ROA 
ROE 
EFF 
r1xy= 0.475 
r2xy= 0.680 
r3xy
r
= -0.595 
1xyz= 0.4111 
r2xyz= 0.7026 
r2xyz
 
r
= -0.5775 
xy ≠ rxyz 
RELSZE ROA 
ROE 
EFF 
r1xy= 0.475 
r2xy= 0.680 
r3xy
r
= -0.595 
1xyz= 0.4732 
r2xyz= 0.7580 
r2xyz
 
r
= -0.6377 
xy ≠ rxyz 
NUMBID ROA 
ROE 
EFF 
r1xy= 0.475 
r2xy= 0.680 
r3xy
r
= -0.595 
 
1xyz= 0.4546 
r2xyz= 0.7503 
r2xyz
 
r
= -0.5977 
xy ≠ rxyz 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
It is observed that the correlation coefficient for the zero order correlation rxy and the correlation 
coefficient for the first order correlation rxyz are not equal in each of the three cases (rxy ≠ rxyz). This 
implies that each of the organizational factors influences the relationship between M&As and 
shareholders’ wealth (rxy = rxyz).  H2 is rejected since rxy ≠ rxyz, and concludes that organizational factors 
influence the relationship between M&As and shareholders wealth.  
 
3.6 Influence of Organizational factors on Shareholder Value 
H3: Organizational factors have no significant influence on the shareholder value 
In order to test this hypothesis, a zero-order correlation was first performed on the shareholder value 
measurements. The results demonstrate statistically significant relationships both at the 95% and the 
99% level of confidence (Table 4). Each of the organizational factors is then introduced onto this 
relationship one at a time and the results observed. 
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Table 4: Zero-order Correlation between Shareholder value Indicators 
Without the effect of any of the moderating variables 
 ROA ROE EFF 
ROA 1   
ROE 0.863** 
0.000 
1  
EFF -0.615** 
0.009 
-0.679** 
0.003 
1 
 (Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
Effect of Relative Size 
Table 4.1: First-Order Correlation between Relative Size and Shareholder value 
With the effect of Relative Size 
 ROA ROE EFF 
ROA 1    
ROE 0.7989 
0.000 
1  
EFF -0.6127 
0.012 
-0.6739 
0.004 
1 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The first-order correlation result presents relative size influencing shareholder value as depicted by 
comparing the results of Table 4.1 with those of Table 4 above.  This is consistent with the findings 
reported by Frensch (2007); Gorton et al. (2009); DePamphilis (2010); Frensch (2007), who found 
evidence that relative sizes of M&As partners influence shareholder value. There is however need to 
examine if such influences are in any way significant in consistence with H3
With the effect of Method of Financing 
.  
 
3.7 Effect of Method of Payment 
 
Table 4.2: First-order Correlation of method of Financing and Shareholder Value 
 ROA ROE EFF 
ROA 1 
 
  
ROE 0.7670 
0.001 
1  
EFF -0.6136 
0.011 
-0.6652 
0.005 
1 
 (Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The result of first-order correlation confirms that the method of financing M&As influence the 
shareholder value. Method of financing has a limiting effect on each of the three measures for 
example, the relationship between ROA and ROE is reduced from r= 0.863**, p = 0.000 to r= 0.767, p= 
0.001. This finding is consistent with Sirower (1997); Houston & Ryngaert (1997); Amihud et al., 
(1990); Chevalier & Redar (2008); Al-Sharkas et al., (2010); Travlos & Papaioannou (1991) established 
evidence linking shareholder value to the choice of the method of financing. 
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3.8 Effect of Number of Bidders 
 
Table 4.3: First-Order Correlation of Number of bidders and Shareholder Value 
With the effect of Number of Bidders 
 ROA  ROE EFF 
ROA 1 
 
  
ROE 0.8071 
0.000 
1  
EFF -0.6146 
0.011 
-0.6885 
0.003 
1 
  (Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The first-order correlation results suggest that the number of bids that a target receives prior to 
M&As influences the shareholders value. Each of the three measures is hindered by introducing the 
variable onto the original zero-order result depicted in Table 4. This is consistent with the findings of 
Sing & Montgomery (1987); Sirower (1997); Frensch (2007); Al-Sharkas et al., (2010) who ascertain 
evidence linking the performance after M&As to the presence or absence of single or multiple bids on 
an individual target. Each set of the results illustrate that the organizational factors influence 
shareholder value. However, in order to test H3, there was need to determine whether the influence 
is statistically significant. A simple regression was performed with each of the organizational factors 
being applied as a predictor of shareholder value. 
 
3.9 Regression Analysis 
3.9.1 Organizational factors as Predictors of ROA 
In order to determine the extent to which the organizational factors influence shareholder value, a 
simple regression analysis was conducted with the organizational factors being used as predictors of 
ROA.  
 
Table 5: R4: Regression results for Organizational factors as Predictors of ROA 
 
 (a) Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .451(a) .203 .044 1.109 
a Predictors: (Constant), Relative size, Method of financing, Number of Bidders  
b Dependent Variable: Organization's average ROA 
                                                
 (b) ANOVA 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4.700 3 1.567 1.273 .319(a) 
  Residual 18.458 15 1.231     
  Total 23.158 18       
a Predictors: (Constant), Relative size, Method of financing, Single bided  
b Dependent Variable: Organization's average ROA 
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  (c) Coefficients 
 Model   
Un-standardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 5.104 1.050   4.863 .000 
   
 
METHFINC
E 
-.365 .215 -.413 -1.696 .111 
   
RELSZE -.139 .141 -.235 -.983 .341 
  NUMBID -.056 .138 -.097 -.405 .691 
a Dependent Variable: Organization's average ROA 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The regression reveal that 20.3% of the variability of the ROA is explained by the predictor variables in 
the model with r = 0.451, F = 1.273 and p = 0.319. Each of the organizational factors relates negatively 
with ROA with 5.6% ≤  r ≤ 36.5%. Since the p value of the F- test is greater than 0.05 i.e. p= 0.319, it 
can be concluded the organizational factors do not significantly influence the ROA. This does not 
mean that these factors do not at all influence the ROA. The presence of the negative standardized (B) 
and unstandardized (β) coefficients ≠ 0, is a clear indication that each of these factors influence ROA 
negatively. For example, a change in method of finance by one unit will result in a change in ROA by 
36.5% in the opposite direction.  
 
3.9.2 Organizational factors as Predictors of ROE 
Organizational factors were used as predictors in a simple regression model to determine the extent 
of the influence of the organizational factors on ROE. 
 
Table 5.1: R5: Regression results for organizational factors as Predictors of ROE  
 
(a) Model summary                                                       
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .363(a) .132 -.042 1.189 
a Predictors: (Constant), Relative size, Method of financing, Number of Bidders 
b Dependent Variable: Organization's average ROE 
  
 (b) ANOVA 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.212 3 1.071 .757 .535(a) 
  Residual 21.209 15 1.414     
  Total 24.421 18       
a Predictors: (Constant), Relative size, Method of financing, Number of Bidders 
b Dependent Variable: Organization's average ROE 
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 (C) Coefficients 
Model   Un-standardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 5.008 1.125   4.451 .000 
   
 
METHFINCE -.258 .231 -.285 -1.120 .280 
   
RELSZE -.155 .151 -.255 -1.023 .323 
  NUMBID -.066 .147 -.112 -.446 .662 
a Dependent Variable: Organization's average ROE 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The regression results affirm that 13.2% of the variance of the ROE is accounted for by the model. The 
number of bidders relates positively with the ROE. Method of financing and relative size each relates 
negatively with the ROE. However, the p- value of the F-test, is not statistically significant at the 95% 
level of confidence because p = 0.535 (p-observed> 0.05) and conclude that the organizational factors 
do not significantly influence ROE at α= 0.05. 
 
3.9.3 Organizational factors as Predictors of EFF 
Organizational results were used as predictors of the EFF. 
 
Table 5.2: R6: Regression results for organizational factors as predictors of EF 
(a) Model Summary                 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .527(a) .278 .111 1.180 
a Predictors: (Constant), Relative size, Single bided, Method of financing 
b Dependent Variable: Organization's average EFF 
 
 (b) ANOVA 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6.961 3 2.320 1.667 .223(a) 
  Residual 18.097 13 1.392     
  Total 25.059 16       
a Predictors: (Constant), Relative size, Single bided, Method of financing 
b Dependent Variable: Organization's average EFF 
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(c) Coefficients  
 Model   
Un-standardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 3.231 1.220   2.649 .020 
   
 
METHFINCE .352 .252 .352 1.396 .186 
   
RELSZE .090 .157 .144 .575 .575 
  NUMBID  -.282 .150 -.463 -1.884 .082 
a Dependent Variable: Organization's average EFF 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
The results indicate that 27.8% of the variance of EFF is explained by the predictor variables in the 
model. From the results, each of the organizational factors relates positively with EFF except for the 
number of bidders. For example, using the un-standardized coefficients to explain the relationship 
increasing the number of bidders by one unit would reduce the value of EFF by 0.282 units if both 
method of financing and relative size are held constant. Conversely, increasing the method of 
payment by one standard deviation would increase EFF by 0.352 standard deviations holding the 
other variables constant. 
 
However, the p-value of the F-test (p= 0.223) is greater than the critical value of p (p≤0.5) at the 95% 
level of significance. It can therefore be concluded that the organizational factors do not influence the 
EFF. 
 
Table 5.3: Summary of Regression Tests for the organizational factors 
                                                          Shareholder Wealth Indicators 
Organizational Factors ROA 
F=1.273, p=0.319 
ROE 
F=0.757, p=0.535 
EFF 
F=1.667, P= 0.223 
Relative Size B= -0.139 β= -0.235 B= -0.258, β= -0.285 B=0.352, β=0.352 
Method of Finance B= -0.365, β= -0.413 B= -0.155, β= -0.255 B=0.090, β=0.144 
Number of Bidders B= -0.056, β= -0.097 B= -0.06, β= -0.122 B= -0.282, β= -0.463 
(Source: Research Data, 2012) 
 
Organizational factors are determined to influence the shareholders wealth (B≠0, β≠ 0) in all three 
tests. Since the p-value >0.05 in all three tests at the desired level of significance, it can be established 
that the organizational factors do not significantly influence the shareholders’ wealth. In this respect, 
we thus fail to reject H3 and confirm that the organizational factors do not significantly influence the 
shareholder value. Failure to reject H3 does not mean that the influence of the organizational factors 
should not focused on by banks seeking M&As but should be considered to the extent that such 
factors are able to influence the success of an intended M&As. This is consistent with the findings in 
Chang (1998); Houston & Ryngaert (1997); Amihud et al. (1990); Sirower (1997); Al-Sharkas et al. 
(2010); Finkelstein & Haleblian (2002); DePamphilis (2010); Moeller et al.(2005) and Sing &  
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Montgomery (1997) who found evidence that the organizational factors have the potential to ruin 
M&As with the greatest potential.   
4. Conclusion  
 
The findings establish that M&As impact on the shareholder value. Using the accounting based 
approach, banks that have undertaken M&As have exhibited posting better results than those that 
have not. In addition, banks that have undertaken M&As have been determined to have posted 
better results than the overall banking sector performance. The findings assert that the organizational 
factors such as relative sizes of merging partners, method of financing M&As and the number of 
bidders in M&As have the potential to influence the realization of a M&As success. The findings 
indicate the importance of considering the size of a potential target, the method to be used in 
financing M&As; whether to use cash or stock swap and the number of bidders bidding for the same 
target.  Choice of method of financing is important because, “if a company takes on to finance M&As 
and the deal goes sour, it runs into financial trouble and the executives are replaced, but if an equity 
financed acquisition goes wrong, the stock price simply underperforms and nobody can be sure why” 
(Hitt et al., 2001). The findings note that the organizational factors acting independently have the 
potential to influence the shareholder value. This implies that the management of banks and other 
organizations intending to undertake M&As should seek to evaluate and consider how these 
organizational factors are likely to impact on the success of the intended M&As. 
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